What Should a 21st Century Defense Be?
These are the years Bill Clinton has eaten.
Years as abhorrent to the future as to the past.
Some periods in history, you look back and you wonder, “What were they thinking of?”
We live in such a time. And we know what we’re thinking of.
Or do we?
The People are quiet. Hard to believe, but they are. The Evil Empires of Opinion Survey and Focus Group keep their products coming, as slick and frenetic as ever. The chattering classes can’t stop chattering long enough to hear the silence. The talk shows and the local news continue serving up their carefully contrived spontaneous snippets and screamathons.
But the People are quiet.
Those who support Mr. Clinton because they’ve nowhere else to go press on with their shtick, behind calculated indignation and plastic smiles that reveal mostly their desire to go home and take a shower. Those who revel in feeling his pain flaunt an ugliness of their own. And those dwindling few who cant that it’s all private, or what-the-hell-we’re-making-money, and who really cares . . . suffice it to say that, at this stage of the exercise, they’re speaking mostly about, and to, themselves.
But the People are silent.
We have a saying in the Marines. As long as the troops are complaining, you know they’re OK. It’s when they get quiet . . .
The People have grown quiet, a silence preceding and preparing for judgment. And before it’s all over, more than Mr. Clinton will be judged, and on far more than the Lewinsky venom and filth. We all have that sense, that dim 3:00 AM foreboding, that there’s something out there, something bad, and it’s coming our way.
What will it be? A cyclical recession? Perhaps worsened by the global mess? A Y2K collapse? More terrorist strikes? Perhaps a weapon of mass destruction, detonated on American soil?
All of the above?
If recession and fear and perhaps catastrophe are the conditions in which Mr. Clinton receives final judgment – who in positions of power, who in positions of influence, will escape being asked: “What were you thinking of?”
And judged by the answers they give, or fail to provide.
The Military Dimension
The Heritage Foundation, specifically my old friend Dr. Kim Holmes, has invited me here today, and kindly flown me in from Seattle, to discuss one aspect, and one result, of the years Bill Clinton has eaten.
Today we confront the accelerating deterioration of our armed forces, and our scandalous, unconscionable, sickening vulnerability to missile attacks on the American homeland. We all know the particulars of our military’s degradation. And we all know, sadly, that no matter what the result of the Defense Department’s “Fall Offensive,” no matter how many billions may be added to the defense budget this year and next, no matter how welcome they might be, long-term, the money ain’t there.
The present defense establishment cannot be sustained, let alone modernized, on any conceivable peacetime budget. The money ain’t there. The money ain’t there. The money ain’t there.
We know the drill. Generals and Admirals speak darkly and in unison of impending readiness free falls. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Jacques Gansler warns of a budgetary “death spiral.” Even Defense Secretary William Cohen seems vexed.
But the money ain’t there. The money ain’t there. The money ain’t there.
And now we have a choice to make. We can continue rationing the poverty, letting that venerable practice segue into military self-cannibalization, sacrificing programs piecemeal, and inviting debility and disaster. Or we can begin the consideration of an alternative: returning the common defense to the structure envisioned by our Founding Fathers – a somewhat smaller but still powerful active establishment, backed by a somewhat larger, militarily effective citizen-soldiery.
To date, this idea has found only two kinds of supporters, outside of the National Guard and reserve communities themselves. Both are right for the wrong reasons. The out-to-lunch left touts the citizen-soldiery in order to trash the defense budget. And our libertarian brethren support it because they favor non-interventionist foreign policies with forces to match, en passant trashing the defense budget.
The defense budget should not and must not be trashed. A citizenry-based force, especially one that takes homeland defense seriously, might be more affordable than the present arrangement. But it will not be cheap. And while America may or may not be the one indispensable nation–lots of folks would love to dispense with us, partially or entirely–all-purpose passivity is a luxury neither we nor the world can afford.
The issue here, to repeat, is not saving money. The issue is whether a citizenry-based defense is once again right for the country: militarily, politically, and morally. And this is an alternative that conservatives, who have for far too long equated strength with tossing money at the Pentagon and citizen participation with submission to a federal draft, should at least consider seriously.
There are, I believe, three reasons for this consideration.
First, the Founders’ rationale, fully understood, is still valid. Perhaps more valid than ever.
Second, it is possible–and we have barely begun to explore the possibilities–that high-technology, far from rendering war an activity for professionals only, actually empowers the citizen-soldier.
And third, a morally and technologically empowered citizen-soldiery makes sense within a defense concept that I call “Space Force, Peace Force, Warriors, Guard.”
To take them in turn:
The Founders’ Rationale
Everybody knows that the Founding Fathers disliked and distrusted large standing armies, in modern parlance large professional military establishments. But the reasons most often cited nowadays for their wariness were, in fact, the least important.
Fear of military dictatorship and worry over the alleged propensity of men on horseback to be always and forever galloping off somewhere provided what one scholar aptly called “the small change” of the standing army debate. In any event, military dictatorship has never been a real possibility in this country and, as de Tocqueville noted (and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have habitually confirmed), in a democracy the greatest pacifists tend to be the generals.
The Founders had two other concerns. One, as former Democratic Senator and defense reformer Gary Hart points out in his recent book, “The Minuteman,” is concern over civilian foreign adventurism. Reliance on the citizen-soldiery has always provided a de facto “People’s veto” on unwise escapading: a fact of life enshrined in the Pentagon’s Total Force Policy and tested in the Gulf War. If a president doesn’t have the popular support to mobilize the citizen-soldiery for some major action, either he hasn’t made his case well enough or he has no case to make.
That old 60s slogan, “What if they gave a war and nobody came?” has deeper national roots than the 60s.
Second, the Founders did a curious thing in 1787. They understood full well that a democratic republic makes enormous demands upon the citizenry. But they eschewed the inculcation of civic virtue at the federal level: no Platonic Republics here. The creation of good, i.e., active and effective citizens would be handled by other institutions, especially family, church, school, and community. But the Founders also depended upon three structured activities to train and involve the citizenry – voting, jury duty, and militia service.
In this sense, the militia functioned as far more than a mere repository of compliant cannon fodder. It was conceived as an exercise in active citizenship. Two legal scholars, Akhil Amar and Alan Hirsch, argue in their book “For the People” that military service, like voting and jury duty, is and should be more than an occasional individual obligation, falling on some, exempting others. Rather, these are rights collectively exercised by the People.
Amar and Hirsch label this notion “populist.” In reality, it is classical: the sensibility that freedom is more than just being left alone. Freedom is also something free people do with each other, in pursuit of common goods and goals, in order to form a more perfect union.
Today, the People must be reconnected to their rights regarding the common defense. At the very least, without active reconnection, there will be no effective homeland defense. BMD will remain hostage to an atavistic minority whose behavior has come to resemble that of diehard segregationists in the 50s and 60s: First, Not Never, then Not Yet, and if you can’t win your arguments any other way, filibuster.
And without the active reconnection of the People, it is doubtful that either the Pentagon or the Congress can muster the military statesmanship necessary to bring the common defense into the 21st century.
Technological Empowerment
But would a citizenry-based force be militarily effective? The answer is a definite maybe.
First, let it be noted that the military is already critically and irrevocably dependent upon the citizen-soldiery. Guard members and service reservists no longer merely support the active establishment. They suffuse it, at every level from boots-in-Bosnia to the Pentagon’s E-ring. The Air Force and the Marines have demonstrated for decades how much can be accomplished with “weekend warriors,” given adequate training and resources . . . and goodwill.
But more, much more, might be done, if we find that high-technology, far from obsolescing the citizen-soldiery, actually empowers it.
This empowerment may come in two ways. First, the “Revolution in Training” – all those virtual reality and computerized games and gizmos – now make it possible to maintain complex individual, crew, and unit skills at historically unprecedented levels. True, simulation can never totally replace field training, or provide that interesting mix of sensations associated with live incoming. But 21st century technology, properly utilized, can drastically cut the time required for post-mobilization train-up . . . in carefully selected early-deploying units.
The second form of empowerment may come through adoption of the “Halt Phase Strategy.” There’s no need to review in this forum all the fun we’ve had with this notion over the last year or two. In essence, Halt holds that in major conventional war, if you stop ’em fast with massive air power and scads (not Scuds) of gee-whiz munitions, you create early stalemate and buy time for a more leisurely ground buildup . . . which means, time to mobilize and prepare the Guard and reserves.
Not surprisingly, opponents of Halt view the concept as a thinly veiled Air Force money grab, irrelevant to many forms of combat (urban warfare, for instance) and at best a gamble in major conflict. “What happens if it doesn’t work?” they ask, with an annoying reasonableness.
Halt may turn out to be American strategy by default. In the early days of war, air power – long-range ground-based and carrier air, especially – may provide the only significant forces available. But whatever Halt’s fate as joint doctrine and/or budgetary priority, it is vital to explore and develop the synergy between America’s citizen-soldiery and America’s air supremacy: a supremacy that must never be lost, or even doubted.
Reconceiving . . . and Restructuring
The defense establishment has finished a “Seven Years War over War,” fought with weapons known to the initiates as BUR, CORM, QDR, and NPD. Not much got settled, save for consensus that the next QDR will be, at best, “No More Mr. Or Ms. Nice Person.”
Some have suggested that it’s time to revisit the National Security Act of 1947. If this happens, and especially if it happens amid national turmoil and (perhaps) after the greatest loss of life on this continent since the Civil War, the present “No More Mr. or Ms. Nice Person” scenario may yield to the political and bureaucratic equivalent of “Take No Prisoners.”
Still, there may be a middle course between business-as-usual, Pompeii or Pearl Harbor style, and radical surgery without anesthesia. I call this option: “Space Force, Peace Force, Warriors, Guard.” It is still little more than a crude paradigm. But it has, I believe, several virtues.
First, it builds upon trends already underway and irreversible within the military, including the interdependence of the services. It requires little, if any, statutory change. It addresses the current threat array. Finally, it provides a structure for greater employment of the citizen-soldiery across the spectrum of threat and conflict.
Space Force
The United States grows ever more dependent, militarily and economically, upon space-based systems. Military and civilian assets must be developed, exploited, and protected. Free use of space must also be denied to those who would use it to harm us, our allies, and our interests.
The Air Force has committed, at least in its doctrinal paper, “Global Engagement,” to evolve into a “space and air force.” It also must evolve a new and far more intimate and productive relationship with the civilian space sector, whose products it must protect and utilize, and whose technologies offer some very attractive alternatives to military R&D. Finally, the Air Force will have to build and manage the space-based aspects of missile and air defense.
Reservists and Guard members, many with civilian careers in the space sector or other relevant fields, already participate deeply in military space activities. This trend should be encouraged. A few years from now, we might wish to begin consideration of spinning off the Space Force as a co-equal branch within the Department of the Air Force . . . a ground-based Space Force that could run very well with a large minority of reservists and Air Guard members working the consoles and meeting a variety of other requirements.
Peace Force
MOOTW–Military Operations Other Than War–are expensive and exhausting. The Pentagon readily concedes that they could not be done today without thousands of citizen-soldiers. This trend should also be encouraged. Active combat units should not be used, and used up, in these activities, save in extremis and then only for short periods.
The Army might consider establishing a separate MOOTW division, composed of active, reserve, and Guard units. The National Guard might also convert units not needed for combat missions into assets designed to complement and enhance the Army’s civil affairs and other relevant units.
A Peace Force should, to the maximum extent possible, draw upon the citizen-soldiery.
Warriors
It is fashionable to argue that, given the range and lethality of modern weapons, everybody in uniform is now a combatant. This is nonsense. All are expected to go in harm’s way when necessary, but only a small percentage have to fight. Combat forces and vital support units, whether preparing for conventional war or “asymmetrical threats,” should be left alone.
These forces should be a fully integrated mix of active, reserve, and Guard units, kept at appropriate levels of tiered readiness. Further, those units, active and citizen-soldier, not designated for combat and vital support should be assigned other tasks.
Guard
This refers to forces missioned and trained for homeland defense and “consequence management.” At present, it is impossible to predict what will be required of a domestic Guard. The Bin Ladins of the world will make that clear, eventually. Active forces (those not slotted for early overseas deployment) will be involved. They should be structured and trained accordingly. But as a general rule, whatever can be done by the Guard and reserves, probably should be done by the Guard and reserves.
Implicit here is a degree of specialization that rejects the venerable notion of “general purpose” forces. Some may argue that, given present and future budgetary constraints, “general purpose” forces are all we can afford. But the reality may be counterintuitive.
If the RMA has any validity, small numbers of warriors may be able to deter and/or defeat much larger formations. Only a minority of our forces will be required on, or even able to get to, future conventional battlefields. The rest, depending upon the world situation, may well be of more value at home.
Obviously, this will be congenial neither to the active Army nor the Army Guard. Both prefer to organize for foreign war. But if there is no reason why the active Army should organize that way, there is certainly no reason for the Guard to maintain the fiction that everybody may someday deploy. Domestic contingencies should be the first priority of many units.
Further, in the case of the Army Guard, it may be desirable to locate “micro-armories” around the country. Ten or twenty people per small community, perhaps co-located with the police or fire station, may have far greater utility than large units sitting in state-of-the-art armories, going nowhere.
Conclusion
In sum, I have suggested that a citizenry-based military, combining 18th century political and moral sensibilities with 21st century technology, might serve us well. A somewhat different military structure and division of tasks might enhance the abilities and performance of the citizen-soldiery. But just as important is the opportunity to reconnect the People to one aspect of our common existence.
There is irony in this. We are told, we’ve been told for decades now, that there is a “rift” between the military and civilian worlds. Whether that rift exists primarily as a fantasy in the minds of certain elites, and whether they need that fantasy for their own personal reasons, may be argued.
What may not be argued is the need for an American renaissance: of thought, of virtue, of participation. Certainly, a return to a citizenry-based common defense could be part of such a renaissance.
Would all of the People have to participate? Of course not, no more than all must vote for an election to be valid or all must serve on juries for the system to work. How many would be necessary? Just enough to do the job, and to provide the example.
And, as the Founders and the ancients knew so well, in any conflict, in any effort, the heroes are self-selecting: men and women who, in the moment of crisis, are simply and suddenly, there.
And that, perhaps, is something we should be thinking about during this season of ugliness and bile.
In our military, and in all else.