What Of Missile Defense?

In a previous world ˜ that existing prior to September 11 ˜ I might have
given this disorganized book a respectful review. After all, ballistic
missile defense can be debated rationally, and the authors hold the kind
of academic and governmental credentials that urge serious
consideration. But today “The Phantom Defense” seems such a mush of
pernicious cliches, willful naivete, technological tunnel-vision and
just plain meandering goofiness that a stern review might almost be
considered a public service. At issue here is not the authors’ total
opposition to missile defense, at least missile defense as it has been
conceived and developed these past four decades. The issue is their
failure of mind, a failure that their impressive resumes can neither
hide nor excuse.

Or maybe their resumes can excuse it. For these are old men, wedded
perhaps to the ways of the bygone era in which they made their careers,
in love perhaps with the belief that something cannot be done because
for so many years they’ve been saying it, and that it should not be done
because . . . well, because other people might not like it.

The authors ˜ a former Foreign Service officer, a former CIA analyst and
a former Pentagon consultant ˜ serve up the usual three objections to
missile defense. It’s technically impossible. It would destabilize
arms-control. It would provoke new arms races. They also indulge in the
standard left-wing criticisms (not entirely wrong) of the Military-Industrial Complex and American foreign policy generally. They equate support for missile defense with either greed or ignorance and dismiss supporters as members of the wacko far right. They offer a few over-recycled bromides concerning various forms of American arrogance
and conclude that national security is best achieved by treaties,
chopping up our own weapons in order to set an example for others and
giving lots more money to the Third World.

The authors begin by raising a valid question. Why has $100 billion
(current dollars) spent on research and testing not produced a single
piece of usable hardware, let alone an effective system? They offer up a
scrawny history of anemic efforts counterpointed by extravagant claims,
but never seem willing to consider one very plausible answer. Nothing
was achieved because nothing was intended. Leave aside the political
aspect ˜ whether Ronald Reagan ever intended to deploy anything (I
believe he did not) or whether Bill Clinton set his own program up to
fail (it’s arguable).

For nearly half-a-century, ballistic missile defense has been run mostly
as a sinecure, a government works project for scientists and engineers
scattered through the universities, the national labs, the contractors
and the military. The dominant pattern has been lethargy, sloth and
cushy cynicism. I first discovered this some years ago while covering
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); the problem seems only to have
intensified since. Perhaps it’s time to get some new skin in the game.
Of course, the authors would answer, the laws of physics are the same
for everybody. Indeed, they base their technological opposition less on
the engineering difficulties of building a system than on one physical
fact: Radar cannot discriminate between real warheads and decoys in
space. They claim that no other remote sensor can, either. Well, how
about some new sensors?

The authors fret that missile defense would destabilize arms control.
What of it? During the Cold War’s final years, a new phrase entered the
lexicon: mutual unilateral cuts. We and the Russians have been doing it
ever since. And by what illogic may it be presumed that a system that
will never, ever work is also destabilizing?

As for the authors’ belief that North Korea, Iran, Iraq and their
brethren will be so inspired by our willingness to forego defenses that
they’ll abandon their own missile projects ˜ it’s hard to believe that
three men of such erudition and attainment could never have encountered
evil before. Or perhaps they genuinely believe that our benevolent
example alone can tame the world’s Saddam Husseins and Osama bin Ladens.

So, what of missile defense? The short answer: It’s neither sin nor
salvation. It’s an aspect of national security that deserves to be
explored and taken for what it’s worth, whatever that might turn out to
be. In this endeavor, as in all scientific and engineering ventures,
there are only two certainties. People who say that something can’t be
done are generally not those who do it. And with each passing year, the
list of things that couldn’t be done, but got done, grows longer.

Philip Gold is a senior fellow of the Seattle-based Discovery Institute.