The Failure of Subsidizing AMTRAK

And How to Make Passenger Trains Profitable Again

An Analysis by J.D. Wong

1. Introduction

Founded 54 years ago, Amtrak set out on a bold adventure to revitalize passenger rail.¹ Fast forward to today, and this experiment has been unsuccessful. Politicians have often crafted routes to win votes rather than attract riders. As a result, Amtrak has been squandering taxpayer money since its start in 1971.

Take, for instance, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021. It allocated a monumental \$66 billion to bolster passenger rail.² Yet, even with this backing, Amtrak's losses soared from \$1.12 billion in FY2019 to \$2.12 billion in FY2024.³ This financial drain isn't new; America's passenger trains have lost money for 79 years.⁴

Amtrak asserts that it is "on-track to reach operational profitability."⁵ Yet, this is a bald-faced lie. While Amtrak reported a loss of \$705.2 million for FY2024, it didn't include:

- 1. \$966.2 million in depreciation.
- 2. \$447.3 million in "Project Related Expenses."
- 3. \$314.1 million in state subsidies, which it classified as revenue.
- 4. \$26.9 million in Office of Inspector General funding.

By omitting these costs, Amtrak paints an optimistic view of its financial health. In reality, Amtrak needs larger subsidies than ever before. In fact, Amtrak has been deceiving Congress with its "path to profitability" since 1990.⁶

Although Amtrak touted a "ridership record" for FY2024, this figure is misleading too.⁷ Ridership numbers don't reflect the average length of each passenger's trip. A more insightful metric is passenger-miles, which measures how far people are traveling. In fact, Amtrak only carried 6.54 billion passenger-miles in FY2024.⁸ This is a decrease of 3.4% since FY2013.⁹

⁷ "Amtrak Sets All-Time Ridership Record in Fiscal Year 2024," amtrak.com, Amtrak, 3 Dec. 2024.

¹ "PUBLIC LAW 91.518-OCT. 30, 1970," U.S. Government Publishing Office, 30 Oct. 1970.

² "PUBLIC LAW 117–58—NOV. 15, 2021," U.S. Government Publishing Office, 15 Nov. 2021.

³ Amtrak Fiscal Years run from October 1 of the preceding year to September 30 of the calendar year. Losses cited include state subsidies and depreciation. "Monthly Performance Report FY 2019," Amtrak, 10 Apr. 2020; "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

⁴ George W. Hilton, "Amtrak, The National Railroad Passenger Corporation," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980; "Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak," Congressional Research Service, 5 Jan. 2021.

⁵ David Shepardson, "Elon Musk says Post Office, Amtrak should be privatized," reuters.com, Reuters, 5 Mar. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/elon-musk-says-post-office-amtrak-should-be-privatized-2025-03-05/ (10 Mar. 2025).

⁶ Joseph Vranich, "End of the Line: The Failure of Amtrak Reform and the Future of America's Passenger Trains," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2004.

https://media.amtrak.com/2024/12/amtrak-sets-all-time-ridership-record-in-fiscal-year-2024/ (17 Feb. 2025). ⁸ "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report." Amtrak. 31 Oct. 2024.

⁹ "U.S. Passenger-Miles," bts.gov, United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2024. https://www.bts.gov/content/us-passenger-miles (23 Feb. 2025).

AMTRAK ROUTES THAT DID NOT RELY ON SUBSIDIES IN FY2024.



Figure 1. Amtrak routes that did not rely on subsidies in FY2024. Source: Calculated from "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

Amtrak's advocates often cite highway "subsidies" to explain its financial debacles. Yet, Amtrak guzzles about 39 times more subsidies per passenger-mile than highways do.¹⁰

Amtrak claims that its new *Acela* trains will bring significant benefits. Yet, the new European high-speed trains, which cost \$2.45 billion, are defective. As a result, *Acela* ridership has decreased by 9.5% since FY2019.¹¹

Inability to match capacity with demand is another reason for Amtrak's persistent losses. For instance, the fare for the 7:24 PM train from Washington to Richmond is \$45. In contrast, a 7:10 PM ticket only costs \$16.¹² This pricing strategy suggests that the 7:24 PM train is more popular. Yet, a train traveling in one direction must also return in the opposite direction. If Amtrak eliminated the 7:10 PM train, it would also need to reduce service in the reverse direction. For this reason, an astonishing 47% of Amtrak's seats are empty.¹³

¹¹ "OIG: New Acela program will likely face future delays due to challenges meeting safety requirements, fixing trainset defects," Amtrak Office of Inspector General, 2 Oct. 2023; "Monthly Performance Report FY 2019," Amtrak, 10 Apr. 2020; "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

¹⁰ J.D. Wong, "A Call for Change: Rethinking Amtrak's Subsidies," townhall.com, Salem Media Group, 1 Mar. 2025. https://townhall.com/columnists/j-d-wong/2025/03/01/rethinking-amtrak-n2652795 (10 Mar. 2025).

¹² "Amtrak Tickets, Schedules, and Train Routes," amtrak.com, Amtrak, 2024. https://www.amtrak.com/home.html (6 Aug. 2024).

¹³ "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.



Figure 2. Transportation subsidies per passenger-mile, 2022.

In stark contrast, America's privately-owned freight railroads are thriving.¹⁴ This profitability of freight stems from its lower frequency sensitivity compared to passengers. Freight is indifferent to whether it leaves early in the morning or late at night. In contrast, inconvenient departure times deter passengers. Since freight trains do not receive subsidies, why should Amtrak?

Amtrak asserts that freight trains delay its passenger services.¹⁵ Yet, Amtrak often makes questionable route choices despite having legal priority over freight. Its former route from Chicago to Miami served Birmingham instead of Atlanta.¹⁶ Now, Amtrak is starting a route from Chicago to Miami via Washington, taking 17 hours longer.¹⁷

¹⁴ "CSX Corp. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results," csx.com, CSX Corporation, 23 Jan. 2025. https://investors.csx.com/news-and-events/news/news-details/2025/CSX-Corp.-Announces-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2024-Results/default.aspx (1 Feb 2025).

¹⁵ Bill Laytner, "Amtrak blames freight trains for passenger delays getting worse," freep.com, Detroit Free Press, 24 Feb. 2020. https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/oakland/2020/02/24/amtrak-blames-freight-trainspassenger-delays-getting-worse/4851468002/ (29 Jul. 2024).

 ¹⁶ "Final Report to Congress on the Amtrak Route System," United States Department of Transportation, Jan. 1979.
¹⁷ "Amtrak Tickets, Schedules, and Train Routes," amtrak.com, Amtrak, 2024. https://www.amtrak.com/home.html

⁽²³ Oct. 2024).

Between Chicago and Los Angeles, the *Desert Wind* lost less money than the *Southwest Chief*.¹⁸ Yet, Amtrak favored the *Southwest Chief*, which passed through more congressional districts. It discontinued the *Desert Wind* in 1997, leaving Las Vegas with no train service.



Figure 3. Chicago to Los Angeles preliminary route alternatives, 1970. Source: "Preliminary Report on Basic National Rail Passenger System," United States Department of Transportation, 1 Nov. 1970.

Despite the demise of its competitor, the *Southwest Chief* still loses money. Its operating losses grew from \$56.1 million in FY2019 to \$83.3 million by FY2024.¹⁹ To make matters worse, it uses tracks that are of lower quality than those used by freight trains. Since 2014, Amtrak has expended over \$45 million on track repairs for the *Southwest Chief*.²⁰

¹⁸ East of Salt Lake City, the Desert Wind and California Zephyr operated as a single train. "Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes," U.S. Government Accountability Office, 14 May 1998.

¹⁹ "Monthly Performance Report FY 2019," Amtrak, 10 Apr. 2020; "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

²⁰ John Green, "Amtrak agrees to match TIGER grant for Southwest Chief route upgrade," hutchnews.com, The Hutchinson News, 27 Feb. 2019. https://www.hutchnews.com/story/news/local/2019/02/27/amtrak-agrees to match-tiger-grant-for-southwest-chief-route-upgrade/5780713007/ (13 Aug. 2024).



Figure 4. Chicago to Los Angeles final route alternatives, 1971. Source: John A. Volpe, "Final Report on Basic National Rail Passenger System," United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 28 Jan. 1971.

Senators Jerry Moran (R-Ks.) and Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) view Amtrak as an "essential service."²¹ Yet, Amtrak accounts for a mere 0.001% of total passenger-miles traveled in the country.

For every small town served by Amtrak, there are at least 40 others with no train service. In fact, Americans travel more miles by bicycle than they do via Amtrak.²²

If Amtrak were to vanish, travelers would still have many options. On many routes, it would cost less to give each passenger a free airline ticket than to subsidize Amtrak. To illustrate, the

²¹ Jerry Moran, "Bipartisan Coalition of Senators Secures \$3 Million Grant Match for Southwest Chief," moran.senate.gov, Jerry Moran, 27 Feb. 2019. https://www.moran.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=D42C71AE-3901-4062-B482-B9504072154A (21 Jan. 2025).

²² "U.S. Passenger-Miles," bts.gov, United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2024. https://www.bts.gov/content/us-passenger-miles (23 Feb. 2025).

average airfare in 2024 was around \$0.23 per passenger-mile. This is much lower than Amtrak's subsidies of \$0.91 per passenger-mile in FY2024.²³

It's important to note that nothing restricts train riders to using unprofitable routes. Many might explore moving to states where train travel is more viable.

Amtrak's website once touted the environmental advantages of train travel. Yet, Amtrak removed this webpage in January 2025.²⁴ This action suggests that Amtrak exaggerated its claims about environmental benefits. Amtrak's most efficient routes, such as the *Auto Train*, could thrive without subsidies. Beyond them, cars, buses, or airplanes could be more efficient than Amtrak's services.

Despite experiencing huge losses, Amtrak awarded \$5 million in bonuses in FY2023. Fourteen of its top leaders received over \$200,000 each.²⁵

Subsidizing Amtrak has set a dangerous precedent for unchecked financial support. With a loss of \$2.12 billion in FY2024, Amtrak has become a bottomless money pit. In contrast, Australia's *Ghan* and *Indian Pacific* operate without subsidies.²⁶ With subsidies ended, some American trains could be profitable too. Instead of throwing good money after bad, Congress should cut Amtrak's subsidies to \$0 in 180 days.

²³ "Revenue Passenger-miles (the number of passengers and the distance flown in thousands (000))," transtats.bts.gov, United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2024. https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=3 (9 Jul. 2024); "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

²⁴ "Travel Green with Amtrak," web.archive.org, Amtrak.

https://web.archive.org/web/20250123184502/https://www.amtrak.com/about-amtrak/sustainability/travel-green.html (19 Feb. 2025).

²⁵ Mark Walker, "Amtrak Pays Executives Six-Figure Bonuses as Losses Continue," NYTimes.com, The New York Times Company, 12 Jun. 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/12/us/politics/amtrak-executive-bonuses.html (24 Jun. 2024).

²⁶ Sam Tomlin, "High rollers only for rail with Indian Pacific set to cut economy class seats," abc.net.au, ABC News (Australia), 7 Mar. 2016. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-08/high-rollers-only-for-rail-as-indian-pacific-cuts-economy-class/7229816 (18 May 2024).

2. State-Supported Routes Under 750 Miles Incur Considerable Losses

Amtrak often attributes its financial struggles to its long-haul routes.²⁷ Yet, the outlook is even bleaker for its short-haul, state-supported routes. With more people working from home, their load factor has dropped from 41% in FY2019 to 38% in FY2024.²⁸Amtrak reported a \$251.5 million loss for these routes in FY2024. Yet, with \$314.1 million in state subsidies included, the true loss hits \$565.6 million.²⁹ This represents a shocking 94% increase from the \$291.7 million lost in FY2019.³⁰

Table 1: Amtrak Load Factor, FY2024					
	Seat-Miles	Passenger-	Empty Seats		
	per Train-	Miles per	per Train-	Load Factor	
	Mile	Train-Mile	Mile		
Northeast Corridor Trains	418	277	141	66%	
State-Supported Trains	322	124	198	38%	
Long-Distance Trains	265	150	115	57%	
Amtrak	323	170	153	53%	

Source: "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

Maintaining train frequency on routes with low travel demand has been unsuccessful. The route from Sacramento to San Jose, for instance, operated 12 times per day with 200 empty seats per train. With a pitiful 28% load factor, it lost over \$45 million in FY2024.³¹

Investments aimed at increasing speed have also proven ineffective. In 2023, for example, Amtrak increased the speed of its trains from Chicago to St. Louis from 79 mph to 110 mph. This project took 14 years and cost taxpayers \$2 billion. Yet, its benefits are dubious, as the route makes nine stops. While the speed limit increased, the average speed only improved by a mere 5 mph.³² Despite the speed increase, the route's load factor changed by less than 1% from FY2019 to FY2024.³³

Amtrak also spent \$181.2 million on the Point Defiance Bypass, which opened in 2017. This new route cut travel time between Seattle and Portland by 10 minutes. Yet, the inaugural train derailed, resulting in three fatalities and injuring 65 others. A federal investigation determined

²⁷ "How Do Long Distance Trains Perform Financially?" Amtrak.com, Amtrak.

https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-long-distance-financial-performance.pdf (17 Jul. 2024).

²⁸ Load factor is the percentage of seats occupied with passengers.

²⁹ "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

³⁰ "Monthly Performance Report FY 2019," Amtrak, 10 Apr. 2020.

³¹ The Capital Corridor operates between Sacramento and San Jose; "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

³² Greg Richardson, "A Slow Path to Higher Speeds," Trains, Kalmbach Publishing Co., Sep. 2024.

³³ "Monthly Performance Report FY 2019," Amtrak, 10 Apr. 2020; "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

that speeding was the primary cause of the derailment. In the wake of this accident, Amtrak closed the route for four years, only resuming operations in 2021.³⁴

Telework has emerged as a faster, cheaper, and more convenient alternative to commuting. On average, remote workers save 72 minutes per day that they would otherwise spend on the road.³⁵ This change not only benefits individuals but also reduces pollution by up to 54%.³⁶ Remote work gives people the freedom to live outside urban areas such as Chicago or St. Louis. In fact, 36% of remote workers said that they planned to move in 2023.³⁷

Given this landscape, Congress should end capital and operating subsidies for state-supported routes. These routes are operating at a mere 38% load factor. This is much lower than the 57% load factor of Amtrak's long-distance routes. With the flexibility that remote work offers, no drive is too long, and no flight is too short. Despite this, politicians are still pushing for Amtrak to invest in short-distance routes. Reducing Amtrak's subsidies to \$0 is the only way to stop the waste of taxpayer money on routes under 750 miles.

³⁴ KING 5 Staff, "Amtrak resumes service on Point Defiance Bypass route 4 years after deadly derailment," king5.com, KING-TV, 18 Nov. 2021. https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/amtrak-point-defiance-bypassroute-resumes-service/281-0904cdaf-83cf-49ac-8cc5-d6463568da17 (28 Mar. 2025).

 ³⁵ Emily Peck, "Remote work saved workers 72 minutes per day, study finds," Axios.com, Axios, 24 Jan. 2023. https://www.axios.com/2023/01/24/remote-work-saved-workers-72-minutes-per-day-study-finds (8 Jul. 2024).
³⁶ Yanqiu Tao, Longqi Yang, Sonia Jaffe, Fereshteh Amini, Peter Bergen, Brent Hecht, and Fengqi You, "Climate mitigation potentials of teleworking are sensitive to changes in lifestyle and workplace rather than ICT usage," National Academy of Sciences, 18 Sep. 2023.

³⁷ Chris Salviati, "Remote worker migration expected to persist in 2023," apartmentlist.com, ApartmentList, 6 Feb. 2023. https://www.apartmentlist.com/research/remote-worker-migration-expected to persist-in-2023 (8 Jul. 2024).

3. Amtrak's Hopeless East-West Routes

In 1928, the *20th Century Limited* was the most profitable passenger train in the world. It often operated in several sections from New York to Chicago to meet demand.³⁸ Yet, no east-west routes have been successful since 1971. To illustrate, Amtrak's east-west routes lost over \$560 million in FY2024. In contrast, the *Auto Train* connecting Virginia and Florida made a \$6.6 million profit.³⁹ This disparity highlights the irremediable lack of economic viability in east-west routes.

Table 2: Passenger Miles, FY2011 and FY2024					
	Passenger-Miles, FY2011 (Millions)	Passenger-Miles, FY2024 (Millions)	Percent Changed		
North-South Routes	4,573.3	4,945.7	+8.14%		
East-West Routes	2,046.8	1,598.5	-21.90%		
Amtrak	6,638.9	6,544.1	-1.43%		

Sources: "Monthly Performance Report for September 2011," Amtrak, 2012; "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Since FY2011, Amtrak's east-west traffic has declined by 21.9%. In fact, east-west routes now make up less than a quarter of total passenger-miles. In contrast, Amtrak's north-south traffic has seen a modest growth of 8.14%. Yet, the Northeast Corridor and the *Auto Train* accounted for 188.99% of that growth. Besides these two routes, even the north-south traffic declined by 13.1%.

Table 3: Daily Passenger Volume, Top 10 Busiest Airline City Pairs, 2023 Q4				
Matropolitan Statistical Area Dair	Geographic	2019 Q4	2023 Q4	Percent
Metropolitali Statistical Alea Fall	Direction	Passengers	Passengers	Changed
New York - Miami	N-S	22,345	25,263	+13.06%
San Francisco - Los Angeles	N-S	23,884	17,440	-26.98%
New York - Los Angeles	E-W	14,675	13,213	-9.96%
New York - Orlando	N-S	11,230	12,581	+12.03%
New York - Chicago	E-W	11,145	9,550	-14.31%
New York - San Francisco	E-W	10,537	8,566	-18.71%
New York - Atlanta	N-S	9,035	8,455	-6.42%
Seattle - Los Angeles	N-S	8,406	7,452	-11.35%
Las Vegas - Los Angeles	E-W	6,568	7,025	+6.96%
Washington - Miami	N-S	6,653	7,018	+5.49%

Source: "Consumer Airfare Report: Table 6 - Contiguous State City-Pair Markets That Average At Least 10 Passengers Per Day," data.transportation.gov, United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs, 19 Apr. 2024. https://data.transportation.gov/Aviation/Consumer-Airfare-Report-Table-6-Contiguous-State-C/yj5y-b2ir/explore/query/ (15 Oct. 2024).

³⁸ Michael Grace, "The 20th Century Limited," NewYorkSocialDiary.com, New York Social Diary LLC., 24 Jan. 2020. https://www.newyorksocialdiary.com/the-20th-century-limited/ (29 Jul. 2024).

³⁹ "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024. Losses cited include state subsidies.

Airlines experienced a 2.4% increase in passenger-miles in 2023 compared to 2019.⁴⁰ Much of this growth occurred along north-south routes connecting the Northeast with Florida. For instance, 25,263 daily passengers flew between New York and Miami in the fourth quarter of 2023. This represents a 13.06% increase from the same period in 2019. In contrast, only 13,213 daily passengers flew between New York and Los Angeles. This is a decrease of 9.96% since the fourth quarter of 2019.

In 2021, Flixbus merged with Greyhound. Since then, it has focused on expanding north-south services rather than east-west routes. Flixbus now offers six daily trips between Chicago and Atlanta, up from five trips in 2019.⁴¹

East-west routes were vital 100 years ago. Yet, the invention of air conditioning changed travel habits to favor north-south routes.⁴² This change reflects a broader shift from work-related trips to leisure travel. Despite this, politicians like Senator Heinrich insist on preserving east-west routes. Reducing Amtrak's subsidies to \$0 is the only way to stop the waste of taxpayer money on east-west routes.

⁴⁰ "Revenue Passenger-miles (the number of passengers and the distance flown in thousands (000))," transtats.bts.gov, United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2024. https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=3 (9 Jul. 2024).

⁴¹ "NABT Timetable Guide," Transcor Inc., 9 Dec. 2019; "Bus Travel in the US," FlixBus.com, FlixBus Inc.. https://www.flixbus.com/ (6 Aug. 2024).

⁴² Lexie Pelchen, "Moving Statistics and Trends For 2024," Forbes.com, Forbes, 24 Apr. 2024.

https://www.forbes.com/home-improvement/moving-services/annual-moving-trend-forecast/ (17 Jul. 2024).

4. The Opportunity Cost of Amtrak's Subsidies

Amtrak's long-haul trains feature two classes of service: coaches and sleeping cars. Sleeping cars offer private rooms at higher fares and are more profitable. In contrast, coach passengers must sleep in their seats, leading to lower revenue. Amtrak's persistence in operating long-haul coaches represents a missed opportunity. All-sleeping car tourist trains, such as the *Ghan*, have thrived in Australia. Unfortunately, political interests have thwarted the removal of coaches from Amtrak's routes.

Table 4: Ticket Revenue, Overnight Long-Haul Routes, FY2022					
Car Tura	Tielest Devenue	Comonity	Lood Footor	Revenue Per	
Cal Type	Ticket Revenue	Capacity	Load Factor	Car-Mile	
Amfleet II Coach Car	\$69,397,926.38	58	60%	\$6.09	
Amfleet I Club / Dinette Car	\$1,085,002.75	17	45%	\$1.76	
Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$52,248,345.01	26-30	44%	\$5.81	
Superliner Coach Car	\$123,272,346.96	74	55%	\$4.01	
Superliner Business Class Car	\$7,262,350.24	74	44%	\$7.71	
Superliner Sleeping Car	\$220,150,291.14	44	61%	\$8.26	
Total / Average	\$473,416,262.48		56%	\$7.18	

Sources: "Amtrak FY2021-2026 Five-Year Service and Asset Line Plans," Amtrak.com, Amtrak. https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtra k-Service-Line-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-26.pdf (30 Jul. 2024); "RIDERSHIP STATISTICS," railpassengers.org, Rail Passengers Association, 2023. https://www.railpassengers.org/resources/ridership-statistics/ (30 Jul. 2024); "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023.

Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures. Adjusted for Auto Train autoracks.

Appendix B provides a breakdown of the FY2022 revenue for each route.⁴³ Take the sleeping cars operating between Chicago and Emeryville, for instance. They earned \$10.87 per car-mile. In stark contrast, the coaches on the same route earned only \$5.25 per car-mile. These coaches operate at a mere 50% load factor, compared to 71% for the sleeping cars.

Table 5 shows that sleeping car fares in 2024 are on par with those from 1946, when trains didn't rely on subsidies. Yet, Amtrak is struggling to sell coach seats even when prices are 80% lower than what they were in 1946. In fact, some sleeping rooms are cheaper now than the adjusted price of coach fares from 1946. For context, two round-trip coach tickets from Chicago to Los Angeles cost \$143 in 1946. When adjusted for inflation, that would be around \$2,477.20 in 2024. In contrast, a roomette for two for the same journey cost only \$2,172 in 2024.

In 2016, Amtrak introduced "Business Class" on some long-haul routes.⁴⁴ It hoped to create an option that filled a middle ground between coach seating and sleeping cars. Yet, Table B-2 shows that Business Class between Seattle and Los Angeles only managed a load factor of 44%. As a result, Amtrak has eliminated Business Class from its overnight long-haul routes.⁴⁵

⁴³ FY2022 is the last year for which this data is available.

^{44 &}quot;Coast Starlight," Amtrak, 11 Jan. 2016.

⁴⁵ "Amtrak Tickets, Schedules, and Train Routes," amtrak.com, Amtrak, 2024. https://www.amtrak.com/home.html (20 May 2024).

Table 5: Round-T	Table 5: Round-Trip Train Fares, 1946 and 2024					
	•		1946 Fares		Danaant	
Route		1946 Fares	(Inflation	2024 Fares	Changed	
			Adjusted)		Changed	
	Coach Seat	\$33.85	\$586.39	\$348.00	-40.65%	
Boston -	Roomette for 1	\$82.75	\$1,433.49	\$1,598.00	+11.48%	
Chicago	Roomette for 2	Unavailab	le in 1946.	\$1,980.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$153.00	\$2,650.43	\$3,804.00	+43.52%	
	Coach Seat	\$30.00	\$519.69	\$184.00	-64.59%	
New York -	Roomette for 1	\$73.50	\$1,273.25	\$1,002.00	-21.30%	
Chicago	Roomette for 2	Unavailab	le in 1946.	\$1,360.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$135.80	\$2,352.48	\$3,740.00	+58.98%	
	Coach Seat	\$25.30	\$438.27	\$172.00	-60.75%	
Washington -	Roomette for 1	\$64.35	\$1,114.74	\$880.00	-21.06%	
Chicago	Roomette for 2	Unavailab	le in 1946.	\$1,212.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$118.40	\$2,051.05	\$2,614.00	+27.45%	
	Coach Seat	\$41.05	\$711.11	\$140.00	-80.31%	
Chicago -	Roomette for 1	\$74.90	\$1,297.50	\$904.00	-30.33%	
Denver	Roomette for 2	Unavailable in 1946.		\$1,316.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$136.20	\$2,359.41	\$2,458.00	+4.18%	
	Coach Seat	\$71.50	\$1,238.60	\$210.00	-83.05%	
Chicago -	Roomette for 1	\$150.45	\$2,606.26	\$1,368.00	-47.51%	
Seattle	Roomette for 2	Unavailab	le in 1946.	\$2,042.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$271.60	\$4,704.95	\$3,444.00	-26.80%	
	Coach Seat	\$71.50	\$1,238.60	\$198.00	-84.01%	
Chicago -	Roomette for 1	\$150.45	\$2,606.26	\$1,390.00	-46.67%	
Emeryville	Roomette for 2	Unavailab	le in 1946.	\$1,968.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$271.60	\$4,704.95	\$3,978.00	-15.45%	
	Coach Seat	\$71.50	\$1,238.60	\$298.00	-75.94%	
Chicago -	Roomette for 1	\$150.45	\$2,606.26	\$1,592.00	-38.92%	
Los Angeles	Roomette for 2	Unavailab	le in 1946.	\$2,172.00		
	Bedroom for 2	\$271.60	\$4,704.95	\$4,482.00	-4.74%	

Sources: "New York Central System Time Tables," New York Central System, 1 Mar. 1946; "Pennsylvania Railroad," Pennsylvania Railroad, 6 Jan. 1946; "Union Pacific Railroad Time Tables," Union Pacific Railroad, 15 Feb. 1946; "Amtrak Tickets, Schedules, and Train Routes," amtrak.com, Amtrak, 2024. https://www.amtrak.com/home.html (11 Jun. 2024); "CPI Inflation Calculator," data.bls.gov, United States

Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Apr. 2024. https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (11 Jun. 2024).

Congress has explored various ways to cut losses from operating long-haul trains. Yet, it hasn't considered the option of eliminating coaches. Australia's privately-owned *Ghan* also experienced

large financial losses when it offered coach services.⁴⁶ Yet, it became profitable after discontinuing these services in 2016.⁴⁷

Amtrak's coaches cater to short-haul passengers, a group that Congress values. Yet, it would cost less to give each passenger a free airline ticket than to subsidize Amtrak. Considering this, Congress should rethink its approach and cut Amtrak's subsidies to \$0. This is the only way to end the misguided incentive that keeps coaches in service.

⁴⁶ Sam Tomlin, "High rollers only for rail with Indian Pacific set to cut economy class seats," abc.net.au, ABC News (Australia), 7 Mar. 2016. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-08/high-rollers-only-for-rail-as-indian-pacific-cuts-economy-class/7229816 (20 May 2024).

⁴⁷ "Darwin To Adelaide 2025," journeybeyondrail.com.au, Journey Beyond, 2024.

https://www.journeybeyondrail.com.au/packages/darwin to adelaide-2025/ (10 Jul. 2024).

5. Privatization Options

The routes connecting Boston and Miami stand out as the most promising of current routes. In fact, they generate a remarkable 67% of American passenger rail revenue.⁴⁸ In contrast, other routes haven't fared as well. For example, efforts to expand the *Auto Train* have stumbled because of low demand.⁴⁹ Privately-owned tourist trains, such as Australia's *Ghan*, have proven more successful. Unfortunately, political inertia has hindered a much-needed tourist-oriented restructuring of Amtrak's long-haul routes.



Figure 5. Potential routes that could operate without either capital or operating subsidies.

These scenic trips offer the most promising alternative to subsidizing Amtrak. In a free market, they could operate without either capital or operating subsidies:

- 1. *Champion*: Hoboken to Miami, operating every four days.
- 2. South Wind: Chicago to Miami, operating every four days.
- 3. *Panoramic*: Hoboken to Los Angeles, operating every four days.
- 4. *West Coast*: Vancouver to Los Angeles, operating every four days.

These routes would deliver a fresh travel experience while leveraging existing tracks. Each train would feature 16 double-deck Superliner cars. The cars would comprise 14 sleeping cars, a

 ⁴⁸ "Investor Relations," gobrightline.com, Brightline, 2024. https://www.gobrightline.com/investor-relations (11
Nov. 2024); "September 2024 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2024.

⁴⁹ Trains Staff, "The Amtrak 'Auto Train' throughout the years," trains.com, Kalmbach Publishing Co., 4 Dec. 2023. https://www.trains.com/trn/railroads/history/the-amtrak-auto-train-throughout-the-years/ (6 Aug. 2024).

dining car, and a Sightseer Lounge. The crew would include an engineer, a conductor, and 17 onboard service staff. There is no need for daily service, since frequency is less critical for tourists. Relying on frequency-sensitive passengers would only doom these routes.

In fact, Rocky Mountaineer already offers service along a part of the *Panoramic* route.⁵⁰ Yet, the *Panoramic* is unlikely to succeed within Amtrak's current route structure. It can only achieve success after the discontinuation of the following existing routes:

- 1. Lake Shore Limited from New York to Chicago and from Boston to Chicago.
- 2. *Pennsylvanian* from New York to Pittsburgh.
- 3. Cardinal from New York to Chicago.
- 4. Southwest Chief from Chicago to Los Angeles.

Appendices D through G list detailed financial projections for each proposed route.

Passenger trains struggled in the 1960s without Superliner sleeping cars. Yet, privately-owned all-sleeping car tourist trains can now be profitable. Unfortunately, private entities cannot compete with subsidized Amtrak routes. Moreover, 49 U.S.C. § 24706(b) prohibits Amtrak from altering its existing routes.⁵¹ Congress should reconsider this approach by ending both capital and operating subsidies. This change would free train companies to focus on popular tourist routes.

 ⁵⁰ Brock Marchant, "This luxury train route is headed for a Salt Lake City station," sltrib.com, The Salt Lake Tribune, 20 Mar. 2020. https://www.sltrib.com/news/2025/03/20/rocky-mountaineer-is-extending-its/ (31 Mar. 2024).
⁵¹ "49 U.S. Code § 24706 - Discontinuance," United States Code, 15 Nov. 2021.

Table 6: Comparison of Current (Subsidized) and Proposed (Unsubsidized) Long-Haul Routes			
Current Routes	Problems Identified	Proposed Solution	
Lorton - Sanford	The sleeping cars earn about 228% more revenue than the coaches.	Sell to the private sector. Liquidate the coaches in favor of sleeping cars.	
New York - Miami	Takes four hours longer than needed. Tunnel clearance in New York precludes the use of Superliner cars.	Sell to the private sector. Reroute to Hoboken to permit the use of Superliner cars. Reroute via Daytona Beach to save four hours. Liquidate the coaches in favor of sleeping cars. Operate every four days.	
New York - Savannah	Duplicative route.	Discontinue service.	
New York - New Orleans	Irremediable route.	Discontinue service.	
Boston / New York - Chicago	Takes four to 12 hours longer	Replace with the Pittsburgh	
New York - Chicago	than needed.	route to save four to 12 hours.	
Chicago - Miami	Takes 17 hours longer than needed.	Sell to the private sector. Reroute via Atlanta to save 17 hours. Liquidate the coaches in favor of sleeping cars. Operate every four days.	
Chicago - New Orleans	Declining population.	Discontinue service.	
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	Sparse population.	Discontinue service.	
Chicago - Emeryville	The sleeping cars earn about 107% more revenue than the coaches.	Sell to the private sector. Extend to Hoboken to remove the train change in Chicago. Reroute via Cedar Rapids and North Platte to save one hour. Reroute to Los Angeles to double the population reached. Liquidate the coaches in favor of sleeping cars. Operate every four days.	
Chicago - Los Angeles	Sparse population.	Replace with the Salt Lake City route to double the population reached.	
Chicago - San Antonio	Sparse population.	Discontinue service.	
New Orleans - Los Angeles	Sparse population.	Discontinue service.	
Seattle - Los Angeles	The sleeping cars earn about 71% more revenue than the coaches.	Sell to the private sector. Extend to Vancouver to increase the population reached. Liquidate the coaches in favor of sleeping cars. Operate every four days.	

Table 7: Proposed Solutions for State-Supported Routes Under 750 Miles			
Current Routes		Problems Identified	
Brunswick - Boston	Pontiac - Chicago	These nextes are exerting at a	
Springfield - New Haven	Port Huron - Chicago	der 750 Miles Problems Identified These routes are operating at a 38% load factor. This abysmal load factor highlights their lack of economic viability. Description Proposed Solution Cut federal subsidies, both capital and operating, to \$0 within 180 days. Transfer the state-supported routes to their respective states. Let the states decide whether to continue	
St. Albans - Washington	Grand Rapids - Chicago		
Burlington - New York	Chicago - Carbondale		
Montreal - New York	Chicago - Quincy	lack of economic viaomity.	
Albany - Niagara Falls	Chicago - St. Louis		
Albany - New York	Kansas City - St. Louis	Proposed Solution	
New York - HarrisburgMilwaukee - ChicagoNew York - PittsburghChicago - St. PaulWashington - RichmondOklahoma City - Fort Worth		Cut federal subsidies, both	
			capital and operating, to 50
		Washington - Newport News	Vancouver - Eugene
Washington - NorfolkSacramento - San JoseWashington - RoanokeOakland - BakersfieldRaleigh - CharlotteSacramento - Bakersfield		state-supported routes to their	
		decide whether to continue	
		subsidizing these routes	
New York - Charlotte	San Luis Obispo - San Diego	subsidizing these foulds.	

Table 8: Proposed Solutions for the Northeast Corridor				
Current Routes	Problems Identified	Proposed Solution		
Boston - Washington (Acela)	Ridership decline. New equipment defective. Unable to recoup capital subsidies and depreciation.	Sell both the trains and infrastructure to Brightline. Cut federal subsidies to \$0		
Boston - Washington	Unable to recoup capital	within 180 days.		
(Regional)	subsidies and depreciation.			

6. Conclusion

The "privatization" of British railways failed due to continued political control over routes. The UK government continues to subsidize train companies, such as Arriva and Keolis. These companies profit from the capital subsidies squandered on their routes.⁵² For this reason, the UK is now renationalizing train services.⁵³ Instead of this, Congress should cut Amtrak's capital and operating subsidies to \$0. Train companies could then focus on serving travelers without political constraints.

Over the past 54 years, Congress has exhausted ways to limit the growth of Amtrak's subsidies. None of its efforts at "reform" have yielded meaningful results:

- 1. Clinging to existing routes is a classic example of the sunk cost fallacy. Amtrak's routes have lost money for 54 years and the cost of operating them will only rise.
- 2. Investing in "high-speed rail" will only exacerbate Amtrak's financial woes. With teleconferencing, the need for short-haul, time-sensitive business travel has diminished. In fact, high-speed *Acela* ridership has decreased by 9.5% since FY2019.
- 3. Changing Amtrak's leadership isn't the answer, either. All that would do is create a scapegoat for the pork barrel spending that has plagued Amtrak for 54 years.
- 4. Outsourcing existing routes to private operators such as Keolis won't fix Amtrak. Taxpayers would still foot the bill because of the lack of economic viability in Amtrak's routes.
- 5. Splitting up long-haul routes is likely to drive away riders and lead to even greater losses. To illustrate, Amtrak's short-haul, state-supported routes operate at a mere 38% load factor. This is much lower than the 57% load factor of Amtrak's long-haul routes.
- 6. In 2002, the Amtrak Reform Council even voted to dissolve Amtrak altogether. Despite this, Congress chose not to act.⁵⁴

The only way to stop politicians from playing favorites with train routes is to cut subsidies to \$0. Political control over subsidies means that ending them would also end that control. Other "reforms" are unlikely to succeed, as they would still allow political interference.

Eliminating subsidies would not spell the end for passenger trains. In fact, Amtrak doesn't own most of the track it uses. Instead, those tracks belong to privately-owned freight railroads. The Northeast Corridor is the exception, being the only major route Amtrak owns. Beyond that, Amtrak has the option of selling its passenger cars. This opens the door for anyone to enter the market and create fresh routes.

⁵² "Should Amtrak Services and Infrastructure be 'Privatized'?" Amtrak.com, Amtrak, 25 Jun. 2019.

⁵³ Reuters, "UK's Labour outlines plan to renationalise railways within 5 years," Reuters.com, Reuters, 25 Ap. 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uks-labour-outlines-plan-renationalise-railways-within-5-years-2024-04-24/ (14 Aug. 2024).

⁵⁴ Joseph Vranich, "End of the Line: The Failure of Amtrak Reform and the Future of America's Passenger Trains," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2004; "Issues in the Reauthorization of Amtrak," crsreports.congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, 5 Jan. 2021.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45942/7 (16 Jan. 2025).

Throughout history, train routes have come and gone in popularity. For instance, the *20th Century Limited* between New York and Chicago thrived in the 1920s.⁵⁵ Later, the *Challenger* from Chicago to Los Angeles gained popularity in the 1930s.⁵⁶ The *California Zephyr* connecting Chicago and Oakland was successful in the 1950s.⁵⁷ Finally, the *Florida Special* from New York to Miami remained solvent in the 1960s.⁵⁸

Brightline Florida, a privately-owned train service, began operations in 2023.⁵⁹ Under a zerosubsidy model, it might consider buying Amtrak. For Brightline, this move could reduce overhead and enhance efficiency. For example, it could sell certain routes to Rocky Mountaineer or Union Pacific. There is also the possibility of auctioning off surplus assets to the public. In the end, Brightline would only preserve the most sustainable routes.

Since Congress can't predict which routes will be successful, it only needs to cut subsidies to \$0. The President should also take a firm stand by vetoing any bill that subsidizes Amtrak. Finally, Congress should repeal the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021. This Act squandered \$66 billion in capital and operating subsidies for passenger rail.

It's time to end an obsolete policy that has wasted taxpayer money for 54 years. The political normalization of subsidies doesn't make them efficient. It only makes politicians complacent. Today's travelers often seek scenic and enjoyable train experiences over basic transportation. The key to freeing up resources for more efficient train services is to end those subsidies. It's time for Congress to stop issuing blank checks and cut Amtrak's subsidies to \$0 in 180 days.

⁵⁵ Michael Grace, "The 20th Century Limited," NewYorkSocialDiary.com, New York Social Diary LLC., 24 Jan. 2020. https://www.newyorksocialdiary.com/the-20th-century-limited/ (29 Jul. 2024).

⁵⁶ "Popular Economy Train of the West The San Francisco Challenger," Union Pacific Railroad.

⁵⁷ "Vista-Dome Views," Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, and Western Pacific Railroad, 1955.

⁵⁸ "Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Time Tables," Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 6 Sep. 1966.

⁵⁹ Not to be confused with Brightline West; "Investor Relations," gobrightline.com, Brightline, 2024.

https://www.gobrightline.com/investor-relations (11 Nov. 2024).

Appendix A. FY2023 Amtrak Operating Results

Table A-1: Fully-Allocated Cost Recovery, I	Table A-1: Fully-Allocated Cost Recovery, Long-Haul Trains, FY2023					
	Operating	Operating				
Douto	Revenue	Expense	Fully-Allocated			
Koute	(Millions)	(Millions)	Cost Recovery			
	FY2023	FY2023				
Lorton - Sanford	\$121.60	\$106.00	117.15%			
New York - Columbia - Miami	\$39.50	\$93.90	40.58%			
New York - Charleston - Miami	\$40.10	\$78.00	50.51%			
New York - Savannah	\$27.90	\$43.20	61.81%			
New York - New Orleans	\$36.60	\$80.10	44.57%			
Boston / New York - Chicago	\$37.00	\$77.10	47.60%			
Washington - Chicago	\$17.50	\$44.10	40.59%			
New York - Chicago	\$8.90	\$28.40	29.93%			
Chicago - New Orleans	\$20.60	\$48.10	41.16%			
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	\$61.10	\$116.10	51.25%			
Chicago - Emeryville	\$59.20	\$134.00	42.35%			
Chicago - Los Angeles	\$43.10	\$124.90	33.71%			
Chicago - San Antonio	\$26.40	\$65.20	38.44%			
New Orleans - Los Angeles	\$11.80	\$56.50	19.29%			
Seattle - Los Angeles	\$44.80	\$92.10	46.15%			
Overnight Long-Haul Trains	\$596.10	\$1187.70	50.19%			

Source: "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023.

Table A-2: Variable Cost Recovery, Long-Haul Trains, FY2023					
	Operating	Variable			
Poute	Revenue	Costs	Variable Cost		
Koute	(Millions)	(Millions)	Recovery		
	FY2023	FY2023			
Lorton - Sanford	\$121.60	\$91.30	133.19%		
New York - Columbia - Miami	\$39.50	\$79.30	49.81%		
New York - Charleston - Miami	\$40.10	\$64.50	62.17%		
New York - Savannah	\$27.90	\$35.00	79.71%		
New York - New Orleans	\$36.60	\$66.50	55.04%		
Boston / New York - Chicago	\$37.00	\$63.90	57.90%		
Washington - Chicago	\$17.50	\$34.20	51.17%		
New York - Chicago	\$8.90	\$21.80	40.83%		
Chicago - New Orleans	\$20.60	\$39.00	52.82%		
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	\$61.10	\$94.60	64.59%		
Chicago - Emeryville	\$59.20	\$105.70	56.01%		
Chicago - Los Angeles	\$43.10	\$104.40	41.28%		
Chicago - San Antonio	\$26.40	\$55.20	47.83%		
New Orleans - Los Angeles	\$11.80	\$45.90	25.71%		
Seattle - Los Angeles	\$44.80	\$75.10	59.65%		
Overnight Long-Haul Trains	\$596.10	\$976.40	61.05%		

Source: "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023.

Table A-3: Gross Ticket Revenue / Operating Expense, State-Supported Trains, FY2023				
	Gross Ticket	Operating	Gross Ticket	
Poute	Revenue	Expense	Revenue /	
Koute	(Millions)	(Millions)	Operating	
	FY2023	FY2023	Expense (%)	
Brunswick - Boston	\$10.90	\$21.40	50.93%	
Springfield - New Haven	\$8.20	\$36.80	22.28%	
St. Albans - Washington	\$3.20	\$11.70	27.35%	
Burlington - New York	\$2.60	\$8.20	31.71%	
Montreal - New York	\$1.20	\$5.80	20.69%	
Albany - Niagara Falls	\$20.00	\$43.30	46.19%	
Albany - New York	\$78.30	\$87.20	73.62%	
New York - Harrisburg	\$26.10	\$100.50	25.97%	
New York - Pittsburgh	\$11.20	\$21.70	51.61%	
Washington - Richmond	\$3.40	\$8.40	40.48%	
Washington - Newport News	\$13.20	\$23.30	56.65%	
Washington - Norfolk	\$17.40	\$31.70	54.89%	
Washington - Roanoke	\$12.00	\$20.20	59.41%	
Raleigh - Charlotte	\$5.60	\$12.10	46.28%	
New York - Charlotte	\$16.20	\$23.50	68.94%	
Pontiac - Chicago	\$21.20	\$46.70	45.40%	
Port Huron - Chicago	\$6.30	\$18.50	34.05%	
Grand Rapids - Chicago	\$3.40	\$8.80	38.64%	
Chicago - Carbondale	\$7.90	\$25.60	30.86%	
Chicago - Quincy	\$3.90	\$18.20	21.43%	
Chicago - St. Louis	\$18.40	\$44.80	41.07%	
Kansas City - St. Louis	\$5.60	\$17.80	31.46%	
Milwaukee - Chicago	\$15.70	\$31.00	50.65%	
Oklahoma City - Fort Worth	\$1.90	\$9.20	20.65%	
Vancouver - Eugene	\$30.60	\$61.00	50.16%	
Sacramento - San Jose	\$21.80	\$67.90	32.11%	
Oakland / Sacramento - Bakersfield	\$27.20	\$101.40	26.82%	
San Luis Obispo - San Diego	\$46.10	\$128.00	36.02%	
State-Supported Trains	\$439.50	\$1034.70	42.48%	

Source: "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023. Note: Excludes food and beverage revenue.

Table A-4: Gross Ticket Revenue / Variable Costs, State-Supported Trains, FY2023			
	Gross Ticket	Variable	Gross Ticket
Poute	Revenue	Costs	Revenue /
Koule	(Millions)	(Millions)	Variable Costs
	FY2023	FY2023	(%)
Brunswick - Boston	\$10.90	\$17.00	64.12%
Springfield - New Haven	\$8.20	\$30.70	26.71%
St. Albans - Washington	\$3.20	\$9.40	34.04%
Burlington - New York	\$2.60	\$6.90	37.68%
Montreal - New York	\$1.20	\$4.90	24.49%
Albany - Niagara Falls	\$20.00	\$36.80	54.35%
Albany - New York	\$78.30	\$68.20	94.13%
New York - Harrisburg	\$26.10	\$77.60	33.63%
New York - Pittsburgh	\$11.20	\$17.30	64.74%
Washington - Richmond	\$3.40	\$7.00	48.57%
Washington - Newport News	\$13.20	\$19.80	66.67%
Washington - Norfolk	\$17.40	\$25.50	68.24%
Washington - Roanoke	\$12.00	\$16.70	71.86%
Raleigh - Charlotte	\$5.60	\$10.00	56.00%
New York - Charlotte	\$16.20	\$20.10	80.60%
Pontiac - Chicago	\$21.20	\$39.60	53.54%
Port Huron - Chicago	\$6.30	\$16.10	39.13%
Grand Rapids - Chicago	\$3.40	\$7.40	45.95%
Chicago - Carbondale	\$7.90	\$22.30	35.43%
Chicago - Quincy	\$3.90	\$15.90	24.53%
Chicago - St. Louis	\$18.40	\$39.20	46.94%
Kansas City - St. Louis	\$5.60	\$15.60	35.90%
Milwaukee - Chicago	\$15.70	\$27.30	57.51%
Oklahoma City - Fort Worth	\$1.90	\$7.50	25.33%
Vancouver - Eugene	\$30.60	\$48.30	63.35%
Sacramento - San Jose	\$21.80	\$55.60	39.21%
Oakland / Sacramento - Bakersfield	\$27.20	\$86.00	31.63%
San Luis Obispo - San Diego	\$46.10	\$104.40	44.16%
State-Supported Trains	\$439.50	\$853.10	51.52%

Source: "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023. Note: Excludes food and beverage revenue.

Table B-1: Ticket Revenue, Overnight Long-Haul Routes, FY2022		
Route	Car Type	Ticket Revenue
Leuten Confent	Superliner Coach Car	\$26,086,188.51
Lorion - Saniord	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$85,436,901.86
Now York Minut	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$34,531,389.44
New York - Miami	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$26,334,212.70
New York New Orleans	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$15,315,914.57
New York - New Orleans	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$10,003,147.97
	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$14,942,272.40
Boston / New York - Chicago	Amfleet I Club / Dinette Car	\$1,085,002.75
	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$13,062,999.85
Washington Chicago	Superliner Coach Car	\$8,232,060.96
washington - Chicago	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$9,475,437.50
New York Chicago	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$4,608,349.97
New York - Unicago	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$2,847,984.48
Chicago New Orleans	Superliner Coach Car	\$8,132,512.50
Chicago - New Orleans	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$4,975,081.22
Chiango Scottla / Dortland	Superliner Coach Car	\$19,366,297.86
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$27,051,912.85
Chicago Emergyille	Superliner Coach Car	\$16,788,002.54
Chicago - Emeryvine	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$34,793,259.27
Chienzo Los Angeles	Superliner Coach Car	\$15,518,250.54
Chicago - Los Aligeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$21,164,229.24
Chicago - San Antonio	Superliner Coach Car	\$15,997,449.80
New Orleans - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$14,713,018.40
	Superliner Coach Car	\$13,151,584.25
Seattle - Los Angeles	Superliner Business Class Car	\$7,262,350.24
	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$22,540,450.80

Appendix B. FY2022 Amtrak Long-Haul Car Type Results

Sources: "Amtrak FY2021-2026 Five-Year Service and Asset Line Plans," Amtrak.com, Amtrak. https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtra k-Service-Line-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-26.pdf (30 Jul. 2024); "RIDERSHIP STATISTICS," railpassengers.org, Rail Passengers Association, 2023. https://www.railpassengers.org/resources/ridership-statistics/ (30 Jul. 2024); "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023.

Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table B-2: Approximate Load Factor, Overnight Long-Haul Routes, FY2022		
Route	Car Type	Load Factor
Lorton - Sanford	Superliner Coach Car	64.13%
	Superliner Sleeping Car	69.47%
Now York Miemi	Amfleet II Coach Car	66.52%
New York - Miann	Viewliner Sleeping Car	40.62%
Now York New Orleans	Amfleet II Coach Car	47.31%
New York - New Orleans	Viewliner Sleeping Car	44.60%
	Amfleet II Coach Car	59.08%
Boston / New York - Chicago	Amfleet I Club / Dinette Car	44.52%
	Viewliner Sleeping Car	49.68%
Washington Chicago	Superliner Coach Car	56.31%
washington - Chicago	Superliner Sleeping Car	64.18%
New York Chicago	Amfleet II Coach Car	54.38%
New York - Chicago	Viewliner Sleeping Car	62.84%
Chicago - New Orleans	Superliner Coach Car	42.15%
	Superliner Sleeping Car	58.36%
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	Superliner Coach Car	48.40%
	Superliner Sleeping Car	61.39%
Chicago Emergyille	Superliner Coach Car	49.93%
Chicago - Emeryville	Superliner Sleeping Car	70.93%
Chicago I as America	Superliner Coach Car	65.74%
Chicago - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	46.41%
Chicago - San Antonio	Superliner Coach Car	55.93%
New Orleans - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	46.90%
	Superliner Coach Car	59.71%
Seattle - Los Angeles	Superliner Business Class Car	43.97%
	Superliner Sleeping Car	58.99%
Overnight Long-Haul Trains	Average	55.58%

Sources: "Amtrak FY2021-2026 Five-Year Service and Asset Line Plans," Amtrak.com, Amtrak.

https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtra k-Service-Line-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-26.pdf (30 Jul. 2024); "RIDERSHIP STATISTICS," railpassengers.org, Rail Passengers Association, 2023. https://www.railpassengers.org/resources/ridership-statistics/ (30 Jul. 2024); "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023.

Note: Unadjusted for crew member sleeping car rooms, except sleeping car attendants. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table B-3: Ticket Revenue / Train-Mile, Overnight Long-Haul Routes, FY2022			
D outo	ConTune	Ticket Revenue	
Route	Car Type	/ Train-Mile	
Lorton Sonford	Superliner Coach Car	\$43.09	
Lonon - Samora	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$141.14	
Now Vork Miami	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$25.45	
New TOIR - Miann	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$19.41	
Now Vork Now Orleans	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$18.85	
New Tork - New Orleans	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$12.31	
	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$21.24	
Boston / New York - Chicago	Amfleet I Club / Dinette Car	\$1.54	
	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$18.57	
Washington Chicago	Superliner Coach Car	\$15.34	
washington - Chicago	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$17.66	
New York Chieses	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$13.09	
New York - Chicago	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$8.09	
Chicago Now Orleans	Superliner Coach Car	\$15.06	
Chicago - New Orleans	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$9.22	
Chicago Scottle / Doutland	Superliner Coach Car	\$12.02	
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$16.80	
Chicago Emergraville	Superliner Coach Car	\$10.49	
Chicago - Emeryvine	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$21.75	
Chinese Les Angeles	Superliner Coach Car	\$10.61	
Chicago - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$14.46	
Chicago - San Antonio	Superliner Coach Car	\$10.66	
New Orleans - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$9.81	
Seattle - Los Angeles	Superliner Coach Car	\$13.96	
	Superliner Business Class Car	\$7.71	
	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$23.93	

Sources: "Amtrak FY2021-2026 Five-Year Service and Asset Line Plans," Amtrak.com, Amtrak. https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtra k-Service-Line-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-26.pdf (30 Jul. 2024); "RIDERSHIP STATISTICS," railpassengers.org, Rail Passengers Association, 2023. https://www.railpassengers.org/resources/ridership-statistics/ (30 Jul. 2024); "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023. Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table B-4: Approximate Ticket Revenue / Car-Mile, Overnight Long-Haul Routes, FY2022		
Poute Car Type		Ticket Revenue
Cai Type	CarType	/ Car-Mile
Lorton Sanford	Superliner Coach Car	\$2.15
Lorton - Samord	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$6.72
Now York Miami	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$6.57
New TOIK - Miann	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$5.03
New York New Orleans	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$6.28
New York - New Orleans	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$6.16
	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$5.07
Boston / New York - Chicago	Amfleet I Club / Dinette Car	\$1.76
	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$7.33
Washington Chicago	Superliner Coach Car	\$5.90
wasnington - Chicago	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$14.13
New York Chieses	Amfleet II Coach Car	\$6.09
New York - Chicago	Viewliner Sleeping Car	\$8.09
Chicago - New Orleans	Superliner Coach Car	\$5.02
	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$9.22
Chicago Scottla / Portland	Superliner Coach Car	\$4.66
Chicago - Seattle / Portland	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$9.72
Chicago Emergyille	Superliner Coach Car	\$5.25
Chicago - Emeryvine	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$10.87
Chicago Los Angeles	Superliner Coach Car	\$5.30
Cincago - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$7.23
Chicago - San Antonio	Superliner Coach Car	\$4.66
New Orleans - Los Angeles	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$7.62
	Superliner Coach Car	\$6.98
Seattle - Los Angeles	Superliner Business Class Car	\$7.71
	Superliner Sleeping Car	\$11.97
Overnight Long-Haul Trains	Average	\$7.18

Sources: "Amtrak FY2021-2026 Five-Year Service and Asset Line Plans," Amtrak.com, Amtrak. https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtra k-Service-Line-Asset-Line-Plans-FY21-26.pdf (30 Jul. 2024); "RIDERSHIP STATISTICS," railpassengers.org, Rail Passengers Association, 2023. https://www.railpassengers.org/resources/ridership-statistics/ (30 Jul. 2024); "September 2023 Monthly Performance Report," Amtrak, 31 Oct. 2023.

Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table C-1: Airline Origin and Destination Passengers in Top 12 Markets, 2023			
Combined Statistical Area	Passengers	Population	Passengers Per Capita
New York, NY	79,375,160	21,859,598	3.63
Los Angeles, CA	66,980,390	18,316,743	3.66
Miami, FL	48,770,650	7,011,936	6.96
Orlando, FL	46,056,600	4,509,624	10.21
Chicago, IL	45,579,300	9,794,558	4.65
San Francisco, CA	45,572,210	9,001,024	5.06
Washington, DC	43,090,000	10,069,592	4.28
Las Vegas, NV	40,120,350	2,392,293	16.77
Dallas, TX	38,724,660	8,654,750	4.47
Denver, CO	38,083,580	3,691,404	10.32
Atlanta, GA	35,192,580	7,221,137	4.87
Top 12 Markets	527,545,480	102,522,659	5.15

Appendix C. Top 12 Airline Origin and Destination Markets, 2023

Source: "DB1BMarket," transtats.bts.gov, United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2024. https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?gnoyr_VQ=FHK (10 Jun. 2024).

Table D-1: Pro Forma Hoboken - Miami <i>Champion</i> , 2026		
Operating Revenues		Percent of
Operating Revenues		Revenue
Diverted From Silver Meteor	\$24,000,000	52.17%
Diverted From Silver Star	\$16,000,000	34.78%
Diverted From Other Routes	\$2,000,000	4.35%
New Route Revenue	\$2,000,000	4.35%
Beverage Revenue	\$1,000,000	2.17%
Merchandise Revenue	\$500,000	1.09%
Advertising Revenue	\$500,000	1.09%
Total	\$46,000,000	100.00%
Our sections Englished		Percent of
Operating Expenses		Expense
Fuel Expense	\$3,550,000	10.07%
Train Operating Crew Expense	\$3,200,000	9.08%
Yard Operations Expense	\$1,000,000	2.84%
On-Board Service Crew Expense	\$5,100,000	14.47%
Track Maintenance Expense	\$1,500,000	4.26%
Locomotive & Car Maintenance Expense	\$9,000,000	25.53%
Commissary Expense	\$1,500,000	4.26%
Station Expense	\$2,400,000	6.81%
Insurance Expense	\$1,500,000	4.26%
Marketing & Sales Expense	\$1,500,000	4.26%
Depreciation Expense	\$5,000,000	14.18%
Total	\$35,250,000	100.00%
Operating Income	\$10,750,000	
Operating Ratio	76.63%	

Appendix D. Hoboken - Miami Champion Route Analysis

Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Silver Meteor* route. Note: Subject to change due to inflation.



Figure D-1. Pro forma operating revenue, Hoboken - Miami Champion, 2026.

Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Silver Meteor* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/. Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.



Figure D-2. Pro forma operating expense, Hoboken - Miami *Champion*, 2026. Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Silver Meteor* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/. Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table E-1: Pro Forma Chicago - Miami South Wind, 2026		
		Percent of
Operating Revenues		Revenue
Chicago - Florida Revenue	\$22,250,000	45.88%
Indianapolis Incremental Revenue	\$3,000,000	6.19%
Louisville Incremental Revenue	\$1,500,000	3.09%
Nashville Incremental Revenue	\$6,000,000	12.37%
Marietta Incremental Revenue	\$8,000,000	16.49%
Other Incremental Revenue	\$2,250,000	4.64%
Florida Intrastate Revenue	\$3,000,000	6.19%
Beverage Revenue	\$1,000,000	2.06%
Merchandise Revenue	\$750,000	1.55%
Advertising Revenue	\$750,000	1.55%
Total	\$48,500,000	100.00%
On erecting Experience		Percent of
		Expense
Fuel Expense	\$4,000,000	10.43%
Train Operating Crew Expense	\$3,600,000	9.39%
Yard Operations Expense	\$1,750,000	4.56%
On-Board Service Crew Expense	\$5,750,000	14.99%
Track Maintenance Expense	\$1,150,000	3.00%
Locomotive & Car Maintenance Expense	\$9,000,000	23.47%
Commissary Expense	\$2,000,000	5.22%
Station Expense	\$3,100,000	8.08%
Insurance Expense	\$1,500,000	3.91%
Marketing & Sales Expense	\$1,500,000	3.91%
Depreciation Expense	\$5,000,000	13.04%
Total	\$38,350,000	100.00%
Operating Income	\$10,150,000	
Operating Ratio	79.07%	

Appendix E. Chicago - Miami South Wind Route Analysis

Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Floridian* route.

Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures. Marietta is a substitute for Atlanta. Other incremental revenue is from Lafayette, Bowling Green, Murfreesboro, and Chattanooga.

There are four possible routes from Chicago to Atlanta.

- 1. A CSX route via Evansville and Nashville.⁶⁰
- 2. Another CSX route goes through Indianapolis and Nashville.⁶¹

⁶⁰ "CSX System Map," csx.com, CSX Corporation, 2024. https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers/maps/csx-system-map/ (20 Aug. 2024).

⁶¹ "CSX System Map," csx.com, CSX Corporation, 2024. https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers/maps/csx-system-map/ (20 Aug. 2024).

- 3. A Norfolk Southern route via Fort Wayne and Cincinnati.⁶²
- 4. A third CSX route via Indianapolis and Cincinnati.⁶³

To maximize demand, the train will use the CSX route via Indianapolis and Nashville.

The train will not stop in Atlanta because there is no suitable station.⁶⁴ Instead, the train will stop in Marietta to serve the Atlanta metro area.

There are five more routes from Atlanta to Jacksonville.

- 1. A CSX route via Manchester and Waycross.⁶⁵
- 2. A Norfolk Southern route via Macon and Valdosta.⁶⁶
- 3. Another Norfolk Southern route from Macon to Jesup, continuing on CSX to Jacksonville.⁶⁷
- 4. Another Norfolk Southern route from Macon to Savannah, continuing on CSX to Jacksonville.⁶⁸
- 5. A CSX route via Augusta and Savannah.⁶⁹

The train will use a CSX route from Chicago to Atlanta, which competes with Norfolk Southern. For this reason, using a Norfolk Southern route south of Atlanta is implausible. Among the CSX options, the train will use the shorter route via Manchester and Waycross.

Finally, the train will use the Florida East Coast Railway from Jacksonville to Miami.

⁶² Robert Wegner, "Norfolk Southern's predecessors," trains.com, Kalmbach Publishing Co., 2012. https://www.trains.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tm0204 a ns-predecessors.pdf (20 Aug. 2024).

 ⁶³ "CSX System Map," csx.com, CSX Corporation, 2024. https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers/maps/csx-system-map/ (20 Aug. 2024).

⁶⁴ "Track No. 1 Sign," Atlanta History Center, 1 Jun. 2020. https://www.atlantahistorycenter.com/blog/track-no-1-sign/ (25 Jun. 2024).

⁶⁵ "CSX System Map," csx.com, CSX Corporation, 2024. https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers/maps/csx-system-map/ (20 Aug. 2024).

⁶⁶ Robert Wegner, "Norfolk Southern's predecessors," trains.com, Kalmbach Publishing Co., 2012.

https://www.trains.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tm0204_a_ns-predecessors.pdf (20 Aug. 2024).

⁶⁷ Robert Wegner, "Norfolk Southern's predecessors," trains.com, Kalmbach Publishing Co., 2012.

https://www.trains.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tm0204_a_ns-predecessors.pdf (20 Aug. 2024). ⁶⁸ Robert Wegner, "Norfolk Southern's predecessors," trains.com, Kalmbach Publishing Co., 2012.

https://www.trains.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tm0204_a_ns-predecessors.pdf (20 Aug. 2024). 69 "CSX System Map," csx.com, CSX Corporation, 2024. https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers/maps/csx-

system-map/ (20 Aug. 2024).



Figure E-1. Pro forma operating revenue, Chicago - Miami South Wind, 2026.

Insurance Expense Marketing & Sales Expense

Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Floridian* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/. Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.



Depreciation Expense

Figure E-2. Pro forma operating expense, Chicago - Miami *South Wind*, 2026. Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Floridian* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/. Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table F-1: Pro Forma Hoboken - Los Angeles Panoramic, 2026			
On anotin a Devenue		Percent of	
Operating Revenue		Revenue	
Diverted From Lake Shore Limited	\$12,000,000	12.63%	
Diverted From Pennsylvanian	\$3,000,000	3.16%	
Diverted From Capitol Limited	\$10,000,000	10.53%	
Diverted From Cardinal	\$2,000,000	2.11%	
Diverted From California Zephyr	\$26,000,000	27.37%	
Diverted From Southwest Chief	\$20,000,000	21.05%	
Diverted From Other Routes	\$2,000,000	2.11%	
New Route Revenue	\$16,000,000	16.84%	
Beverage Revenue	\$2,000,000	2.11%	
Merchandise Revenue	\$1,000,000	1.05%	
Advertising Revenue	\$1,000,000	1.05%	
Total	\$95,000,000	100.00%	
Operating Expense		Percent of	
		Expense	
Fuel Expense	\$8,550,000	11.59%	
Train Operating Crew Expense	\$7,650,000	10.37%	
Yard Operations Expense	\$1,500,000	2.03%	
On-Board Service Crew Expense	\$12,200,000	16.53%	
Track Maintenance Expense	\$2,500,000	3.39%	
Locomotive & Car Maintenance Expense	\$18,000,000	24.39%	
Commissary Expense	\$4,000,000	5.42%	
Station Expense	\$3,400,000	4.61%	
Insurance Expense	\$3,000,000	4.07%	
Marketing & Sales Expense	\$3,000,000	4.07%	
Depreciation Expense	\$10,000,000	13.55%	
Total	\$73,800,000	100.00%	
Operating Income	\$21,200,000		
Operating Ratio	77.68%		

Appendix F. Hoboken - Los Angeles Panoramic Route Analysis

Source: Based on operating results for the existing *California Zephyr* route. Note: Subject to change due to inflation.

There are four potential routes from Chicago to Denver.

- 1. A BNSF route via Omaha, which is the existing *California Zephyr* route.⁷⁰
- 2. A parallel Union Pacific route, which also goes through Omaha.⁷¹

⁷¹ "Union Pacific System Map," up.com, Union Pacific.

https://www.up.com/cs/groups/public/documents/up_pdf_nativedocs/pdf_system_map.pdf (21 May 2024).

⁷⁰ "BNSF Network Map," bnsf.com, BNSF Railway, 2021. https://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/ship-withbnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/bnsf-network-map.pdf (21 May 2024).

- 3. A BNSF route to Kansas City,⁷² followed by a Union Pacific route to Denver.⁷³
- 4. A BNSF route that goes through Kansas City and Pueblo to reach Denver.⁷⁴

The route cannot serve both Omaha and Kansas City due to geography. Stopping in Kansas City would incur an extra annual cost of \$1.7 million, while only adding \$1.25 million in revenue. Furthermore, the Union Pacific track from Kansas City to Denver is subpar Class 3 track. The BNSF route via Kansas City leads to Pueblo, adding an extra four hours of travel time in each direction.

In contrast, the Omaha routes offer better options: BNSF is Class 4 track and Union Pacific is Class 5 track.⁷⁵ For this reason, the train will use the Union Pacific route via Omaha.

From Denver to Salt Lake City, the train will continue using the California Zephyr route.

West of Salt Lake City, there are three possible routes.

- 1. A Union Pacific route to Emeryville, which is the existing *California Zephyr* route.⁷⁶
- 2. Another Union Pacific route to Los Angeles via Las Vegas.⁷⁷
- 3. A Union Pacific route to Portland through Pocatello,⁷⁸ followed by a BNSF route to Seattle.⁷⁹

To maximize demand, the train will take the route to Los Angeles.

⁷⁶ "Union Pacific System Map," up.com, Union Pacific.

⁷² "BNSF Network Map," bnsf.com, BNSF Railway, 2021. https://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/ship-withbnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/bnsf-network-map.pdf (21 May 2024).

⁷³ "Union Pacific System Map," up.com, Union Pacific.

https://www.up.com/cs/groups/public/documents/up_pdf_nativedocs/pdf_system_map.pdf (21 May 2024).

⁷⁴ "BNSF Network Map," bnsf.com, BNSF Railway, 2021. https://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/ship-with-bnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/bnsf-network-map.pdf (21 May 2024).

⁷⁵ "Iowa State Rail Plan Final, Appendix A," iowadot.gov, Iowa Department of Transportation, 2017.

https://iowadot.gov/iowainmotion/railplan/2017/IowaSRP2017_AppendixA.pdf (21 May 2024).

https://www.up.com/cs/groups/public/documents/up_pdf_nativedocs/pdf_system_map.pdf (21 May 2024). ⁷⁷ "Union Pacific System Map," up.com, Union Pacific.

https://www.up.com/cs/groups/public/documents/up_pdf_nativedocs/pdf_system_map.pdf (21 May 2024). ⁷⁸ "Union Pacific System Map," up.com, Union Pacific.

https://www.up.com/cs/groups/public/documents/up_pdf_nativedocs/pdf_system_map.pdf (21 May 2024). ⁷⁹ "BNSF Network Map," bnsf.com, BNSF Railway, 2021. https://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/ship-with-bnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/bnsf-network-map.pdf (21 May 2024).



Figure F-1. Pro forma operating revenue, Hoboken - Los Angeles *Panoramic*, 2026. Source: Based on operating results for the existing *California Zephyr* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/.

Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures.



Figure F-2. Pro forma operating expense, Hoboken - Los Angeles *Panoramic*, 2026. Source: Based on operating results for the existing *California Zephyr* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/.

Note: Independent rounding may lead to different figures.

Table G-1: Pro Forma Vancouver - Los Angeles West Coast, 2026		
On creating Personne		Percent of
Operating Revenue		Revenue
Inherited From Coast Starlight	\$32,000,000	66.67%
Diverted From Other Routes	\$3,000,000	6.25%
New Route Revenue	\$10,500,000	21.88%
Beverage Revenue	\$1,000,000	2.08%
Merchandise Revenue	\$750,000	1.56%
Advertising Revenue	\$750,000	1.56%
Total	\$48,000,000	100.00%
Operating Eveness		Percent of
Operating Expense		Expense
Fuel Expense	\$4,000,000	10.58%
Train Operating Crew Expense	\$3,600,000	9.52%
Yard Operations Expense	\$1,250,000	3.31%
On-Board Service Crew Expense	\$5,700,000	15.08%
Track Maintenance Expense	\$1,150,000	3.04%
Locomotive & Car Maintenance Expense	\$9,000,000	23.81%
Commissary Expense	\$2,000,000	5.29%
Station Expense	\$3,100,000	8.20%
Insurance Expense	\$1,500,000	3.97%
Marketing & Sales Expense	\$1,500,000	3.97%
Depreciation Expense	\$5,000,000	13.23%
Total	\$37,800,000	100.00%
Operating Income	\$10,200,000	
Operating Ratio	78.75%	

Appendix G. Vancouver - Los Angeles West Coast Route Analysis

Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Coast Starlight* route. Note: Subject to change due to inflation.



Figure G-1. Pro forma operating revenue, Vancouver - Los Angeles *West Coast*, 2026. Source: Based on operating results for the existing *Coast Starlight* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/. Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.



Figure G-2. Pro forma operating expense, Vancouver - Los Angeles *West Coast*, 2026. Source: Based on industry averages for the existing *Coast Starlight* route. Chart from https://www.meta-chart.com/. Note: Subject to change due to inflation. Independent rounding may lead to different figures.